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ABSTRACT
The paper critiques the prevailing liberal market economy models of 
religious liberty and religious encounter. In place of market models, this 
paper argues that values inscribed in gift exchange, hospitality, guest/host 
relations, in many cases, and to varying degrees, provide better alternative 
values to govern religious interaction than those of the market model. Instead 
of conceiving religion as commodity for “sale” – adoption, conversion – 
and instead of conceiving missionaries as salespeople for their religions, I 
propose that the encounter of religions could be better conceived in terms 
of guest/host, gift giver/gift receiver relations. “Freakonomics,” therefore, – 
whether in free market or monopoly form – does not, therefore, write the 
last page in the story of religious liberty. 
KEYWORDS
Armenia, Freakonomics, guest/host, Holy Armenian Apostolic Church, 
liberty, market values, missionaries, religion.
“Religious Liberty” as Commodity
In May of 2013, I was invited to lecture in Armenia on religious 
liberty. Instead of teaching, I was “taken to school” about how West 
and East clashed over religious liberty. For Western governmental, 
religious and humanitarian groups, the values governing religious 
liberty or freedom were analogous to the values governing 
economic markets. The religious “marketplace” should be free and 
open to all competitors. Religious people should be free to make 
a “rational choice” of a religion. They should not be regulated in 
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making their fundamental religious decisions. Individual conscience 
should be their guide. For the East – the Holy Armenia Apostolic 
Church (HAAC, hereafter), economic values likewise governed the 
way it should be with religion. In their case, however, the religious 
“marketplace” should be tightly regulated, indeed made subject to their 
monopoly. What mattered most were the historic collective values of 
national identity and history. Such values put the HAAC firmly in control 
of religious transactions in the religious marketplace in Armenia. I want 
first of all to point out that both West and East assume a market model of 
religion. They differ only as to the degree of freedom in that market. Both, 
in effect, would agree that the dominant values of the religious realm 
conform to what Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner have written 
in their book, Freakonomics. (Levitt & Dubner 2009). The discourse 
on international religious liberty is, thus, thought to play (and ought 
to play) by Levitt and Dubner’s “hidden” rules of economic exchange.
 But, should it? I shall argue that the standard “Freakonomic” model 
may encounter intractable obstacles to successful application. The 
market model need not govern religious encounter and exchange any 
more than it needs to encompass all our other kinds of exchange. All 
the more applies with equal force to monopolists, like the HAAC. The 
values inherent in what we call “the economy,” the market, whether free 
or regulated, is a relatively late, though doubtless often overwhelming. 
Religious folk should, for instance, choose the “best” religion – one that 
rationally maximized their religious “profit,” such as their opportunity for 
salvation. But, if we follow Karl Polanyi’s powerful sweeping arguments 
in his The Great Transformation, then we would recognize that profit-
maximizing rationality was not always the dominant value in systems 
of human exchange. (Polanyi 1944) Without reciting Polanyi’s entire 
arguments, we can glean from him the notion of the historicity of our 
values about exchange. While it is natural for us, who are dominated 
by the values of economic society, to regard our world with the market 
foremost in mind, other peoples, past and present, need not do so as 
well, or at least in as thoroughgoing a fashion as we do. 
 With Polanyi in mind, I want to argue, instead, that it might be 
better to think about religious liberty on models embodying other kinds 
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of values than those dominating our thinking as citizens of economic 
society. I suggest that the values inscribed in gift exchange, of 
hospitality – of guest/host, not economic exchange – provide alternative 
values governing religious interaction to those of the market model. 
“Freakonomics” – whether in free market or monopoly form – does not 
write the last page in the story of religious liberty. 
The Market Values of the Venice Commission Report in Armenia
 To set my thesis in a concrete context, I would point out how 
prominent official agencies in the West, such as the European Union’s 
Venice Commission conceive the engagement of religions in the public 
square. For them, not surprisingly, a dominant liberal, rational choice – 
indeed, “Freakonomic” – model rules. Market values inform official thinking 
about how religions should get on in a liberal democratic nation-state. 
Religions thus “sell” their wares (proselytize), “buy into” or “buy out” of a 
condition of membership (are converted or depart), “win over customers” 
(gain converts), satisfy their “consumers” (believers, adherents), and so 
on. In its report of 14-15 October 2011, the Venice Commission concluded 
its review of proposed revisions to the Armenian constitution and the role 
of the HAAC. These revisions granted to the HAAC a “list of exclusive 
missions” (in Freakonomic terms, “franchises”) such as ‘freely preaching 
and disseminating its religion’; ‘building new churches’; contributing to 
the spiritual education of the Armenian people” and so on. Critically, 
in Paragraph 96, the Venice Commission report noted, “that other 
religious associations will not be allowed to engage in such activities” (in 
Freakonomic terms, establish a cartel or monopoly). In effect, the HAAC 
sought to monopolize the field of religious choice in Armenia, to “corner 
the market,” so to speak. “Such a restriction,” the report goes on, “would 
violate international standards on freedom of religion or belief and on the 
prohibition of non-discrimination” (Flanagan, et al. 2011)1 – because it 
violated the value of the autonomy of the “market.”
1 Much the same principles have been enunciated in the US Congress’ “International 
Religious Freedom Act of 1998” (H. R. 2431), which, in turn, cites a list of international 
accords on religious freedom as its precedents – among them, prominently the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
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 For convenience sake, I shall call this a “market” model, because 
major Western institutions, like the EU or the US government, like 
to say, or think, that religions are, or ought to be, “free,” in, at least, 
an analogous sense to that in which liberal economists imagine the 
market for goods and services is, or should be, “free.” But, as we may 
be learning, religious institutions, like all the institutions of civil society, 
are neither absolutely, autonomous, free or sovereign – even though 
they try mightily so to be. Religious institutions depend as much upon 
political and economic institutions as another. Few churches get built, 
and thus does the liberty to build them get exercised, as well, across 
Aleppo-like war-torn landscapes. Even under the normal conditions of 
life in a nation-state, as long as the state maintains its designated hold 
on the monopoly of the use of force in a society, it can always coerce 
any institution to submit to state influence, if not control. Recent radical 
movements for will-o’-the-wisp church sovereignty in the United States 
seem to have taken this to heart, in dramatic ways. When Liberty Baptist 
University opened an on-campus shooting range, it attracted national 
media attention (Shapiro 2016). So, as well, did the increased activity 
of an influential Roman Catholic group “ChurchMilitant” (http://www.
churchmilitant.com/). But, at the moment, the Eurasian state maintains 
“sovereignty,” not the churches.  But even here, as far as the state is 
concerned, if one means by ”state,” the “nation-state,” we might want 
to reserve final judgment about the real extent of the sovereignty of 
today’s nation-states until we can better calculate how far globalized 
interdependence and multi-national corporations compromise their 
“freedom” or “sovereignty.”
 Until quite recently, Armenia, with its ancient established church, 
the Holy Apostolic Armenian Church, (HAAC) was facing the demands 
of the EU Venice Commission’s reforms of its public policy and 
practice in the area of “religious liberty,” so called. Things changed 
in early September 2013, however, when further negotiations for full 
association of Armenia with the EU were suspended, in favor of far 
weaker plans for relations. At that point, the Armenian government may 
have, perhaps, realized just what the costs of actual association with 
the EU would be, as spelt out by the Venice Commission, especially in 
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light of what could be seen as geopolitically more natural association 
with Russia’s EurAsEC Customs Union. After all, large numbers of 
otherwise un- or under-employed Armenians worked in Russia. The 
EurAs EC Customs Union made no demands similar to those required 
by the Venice Commission’s rigorous “religious liberty” requirements. 
But, although the particular drama of Armenia’s approach to the EU 
may be suspended, the lessons learned in the process of negotiation 
still apply. To wit, although pluralistic tolerance and “religious liberty” 
were affirmed in the constitution of the Republic of Armenia, the 
Venice Commission’s report found their official adherence to the 
letter and spirit of the constitution at odds with its noble aspirations. 
The Commission claimed that minority churches suffered a range of 
restrictions, and sometimes even outright harassment. These range 
from the non-HAAC churches publically being declared “cults” to 
limitations being placed upon their ability to proselytize, mobilize, or 
even advertise their existence. Some of the minority churches even 
complained of incidents threatening their physical well-being. Against 
this background of intimidation and hostility, the government seemed to 
favor the HAAC in ways that exceeded its undisputed and well-earned 
recognition in the formation and preservation of Armenian national 
identity (Flanagan, et al. 2011). Without my fully being aware of it at the 
time, Armenia was shaping up as a remarkable case where the battle 
lines had been drawn – as perplexing as this may sound – between 
the opposed forces of religious freedom against those of freedom of 
religion. But, there was more. It also highlighted certain confusing 
and contrary things about the international religious liberty agenda’s 
campaign for “religious liberty,” (whatever that means?) itself.
 Nowhere more thoroughly does the Council of Europe reveal what 
values animate it than the Venice Commission report. This document, 
and indeed the policies of the Council of Europe as a whole, regarding 
religious liberty, make liberal values of free choice primary. These 
values permeate, and are officially inscribed into, Western society in 
all, if not most, of its domains – including everything from free choice of 
beliefs, ideas and values to those of association and companionship, 
as well as to the market place for goods and services. To cite but one 
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of many examples that might be mentions, the Venice Commission 
report states in Paragraph 93, while reiterating the judgments of earlier 
documents, that “individuals and groups should be free to practice 
their religion without registration if they so desire – regardless of 
how small or large their group may be”(Flanagan, et al. 2011). The 
Venice Commission even singles out the cardinal value of being free 
to “proselytize” – in effect, to publicize, in effect, offer for sale, adopt or 
acquire – particular religious association.2 In Paragraph 44, the report 
states that the government 
must take into account that any limitation on proselytism or the man-
ifestation of religion, which is a fundamental right, requires careful 
assessment. There is a thin line between the right to manifest one’s 
religion and change one’s beliefs and the right to religious expres-
sion, the right to impart and receive even offensive ideas that shock 
and disturb – yet these are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society.”  
 Another way to look at this assertion of liberal values in regards to 
religion is to see them Freakonomically – as the same as the values 
of the free market. The Venice Commission thus imagines a world 
shaped by the values of the market, free and rational choice, a venue 
in which made up of willing buyers and willing sellers. Paragraph 56 
accordingly states that “most democratic legal systems do not regulate 
proselytism per se… Special laws targeting religious persuasion are 
likely to lead to discrimination and may result in unjust curtailment of 
legitimate manifestations of religion…” The Council of Europe has, in 
effect, declared – or at the very least assumes – a world in which there 
ideally exists what is, in effect, an open, free “market” in religious beliefs. 
 In such a construction of the values governing religious social reality, 
they, likewise, assume neutrality among religious beliefs. No religion 
deserves being privileged save by its ability to attract adherents. And, 
not even those religions, such as the national churches of the East or 
the established churches of the West, that may actually be privileged 
(monopolies) should feel entitled to their privileges. Again, the values 
2 See especially paragraphs 42-59.
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of there being willing buyers and willing sellers, so to speak, should 
prevail, not the controlled “market” preferred by the national churches 
of the East. In Western liberal eyes, to revert again to an economic 
metaphor, no one is permitted to “have their thumbs on the scale,” 
so to speak, to gain or deserve an advantage over any other buyer 
or seller. In the eyes of the Venice Commission, all religions ought to 
expect to compete equally and “fairly” (sic) for adherents. Ideally, the 
market will not favor any participant, and thus each enters the market 
as an equal. In the same way candidates for office appeal for votes 
or, say, automobile, appliance, dry-cleaning, baguette, or computer 
sales-folk appeal for potential buyers of their goods and services, so 
also do the religions compete for “consumers.” The religions offer their 
potential “consumers” a commodity – here, religious belief – and the 
religious marketplace decides how to value it. The Venice Commission 
thus affirms values common to those of the liberal economic market as 
those that will govern interaction among religions. Not so, as we will 
see, in the monopoly-minded East.
When a Free Market of Religions is Not Really Free
 It is not hard to understand why the HAAC seems determined to 
resist the Venice Commission’s open market model of religious relations. 
Any free market of religions would presume an equally endowed array 
of willing sellers and willing buyers. But, the HAAC does not believe 
present-day Armenia fits the model of being an equal player. It has been 
greatly disadvantaged by the vicissitudes of modern history. Markets 
need those willing sellers and willing buyers, of which I have already 
spoken. Even if it did want to compete in a free market, seventy years 
of systematic Soviet efforts to destroy the HAAC, and all remnants of 
religion in Armenia have depleted the Apostolic Church’s resources of 
a mature clergy and healthy institutional basis. The Apostolic Church 
feels that it deserves some consideration for preserving both Armenian 
nationality and local Christianity through the Soviet period of active 
oppression of religion. That consideration may well be a permanent 
monopoly of the religious marketplace for the HAAC. Witness, perhaps 
to the insensitivity of the arrogant West in appreciating the HAAC’s 
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weakened condition, she is being asked to compete in a “market” 
rigged against her – a market that is not really “free.” Instead of equally 
endowed willing buyers and willing sellers, the HAAC faces well-funded 
and energized religious competitors from abroad. 
 On the side of the new Protestant missionizing churches, the view 
differs considerably. These small, sometime struggling communities, 
such as the Jehovah Witnesses, for instance, see themselves 
disadvantaged in comparison to the larger and historically more deeply 
rooted HAAC. To them, it represents a stifling, traditionalist monopoly 
religion that wants to maintain its hegemony, and restrict the religious 
choices of Armenians. The Apostolic Church thereby seeks to deny 
Armenians their religious freedom, their inalienable human right to 
religious liberty, and thus to free exercise of their religions. It is the 
past, and they represent the future. From documents like the USA’s 
International RFRA or the EU’s Venice Commission report, the West is 
seen as agreeing with the new missionizing churches. 
 One example that illustrates what sparked such anxiety for the 
HAAC in the post-Soviet world was the power of such outside groups 
like the Church of the Latter-Day Saints (LDS, hereafter). Notable here 
were the innocent-seeming, indeed generous, philanthropic activities 
of Jon Huntsman, Sr., father of the GOP presidential candidate, Jon 
Huntsman, Jr. After the 1988 earthquake in northern Armenia, he 
capped a 25-year effort of philanthropy in Armenia by funding massive 
rebuilding projects, founding schools and health care facilities, 
providing for scholarships for Armenian students to study at Utah State 
University, and so on. Up against one of the world’s richest persons, 
and a conspicuous adherent to the LDS, it is small wonder that the 
relatively threadbare HAAC felt outclassed!  Reasonable or not, the 
Apostolic Church sees itself and its position in Armenia threatened by 
well-meaning, international forces.3 The HAAC sees the power of a 
3 We need not slight the genuine good Huntsman’s resources have done for Armenia. Nor, 
do we need to slip into an easy cynicism about the ulterior religious motives in Huntsman’s 
gifts. Of course, Huntsman’s gift is not “free.” As a long-time student of Marcel Mauss, I 
accept that obligation rules the world of gift giving. All gifts are given under obligation – I 
must give gifts are also accepted under obligation – I must accept the gift. And, what is 
more, they are repaid with a force of obligation – I must repay the gift. But, facing the reality 
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globalized network of religions, mostly based in the US, and funded by 
American congregations, such as the LDS, as threats to the HAAC’s 
historical monopoly in the religious world of Armenian homeland. And, 
make no mistake, the term “monopoly” fits the Armenian situation well, 
even as the HAAC’s perfection of that sort of regime has never been 
complete and has lately been slipping.
Learning from Armenia about Religious Liberty, or Lack of it?  
 Assuming liberal or market values when it comes to religion might 
seem like an obvious and unremarkable place to begin thinking about the 
engagement of religions in the public square. But, for liberal advocates 
of religious liberty, Armenia and other nations with state churches, deal 
out unexpected lessons. Here, polarization rules. Combatants on either 
side are as entrenched as First World War armies facing each other 
across the front lines. As far as my visit to Armenia went, doors had 
been slammed shut even before I had tried to walk in. Unlike the world 
of a liberal market of religions, presumed by the Venice Commission 
(and in theory, the Armenian constitution, at least as the EU wished it to 
become), Armenia represents an entirely different, and hostile territory. 
It is one thing to think about such matters, but really another one to live 
through them. What was remarkable was the pre-emptive nature of the 
collision with those who saw me an opponent from my very first day 
there. The audiences I was scheduled to address showed promise – 
students at a teachers’ college or the American University of Armenia, 
seminarians of the HAAC, representatives of local NGOs and leaders 
from local Protestant communities, such as evangelicals, and US 
affiliated Protestant missionary congregations, such as the LDS – even 
a national TV audience in prime time. But, no matter how varied these 
venues, the same entrenched positions stifled serious questioning of 
any kind from the get-go. These considerations might then be thought 
a tad theoretical, since the very structure of opposition worked to make 
of gift giving as interested doesn’t condemn us to cynicism. It only forces us to face reality 
of living in a world of relationships. And, that reality – even Huntsman – can be good, 
however, motivated, or however not “optimal” from a given point of view.
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it even impossible to explore, much less entertain, value options, much 
less to promote a certain values.
 Besides the “schooling” Armenia’s polarized religious situation 
gave me, recent criticisms of the international religious liberty agenda 
by the likes of Elizabeth Shakman Hurd have also given many of us 
reason to rethink the entire issue (Hurd 2008; Hurd 2014). Is it always 
in the best interests of people to assert their right to religious liberty? 
Are other interests, such as maintaining the social peace of a convivium 
with other peoples of different religions, more desirable? Would the 
assertion by one religious group of their religious liberty only provoke 
endless destructive conflict, and so on? Would not human welfare, 
Hurd, in effect suggests, be better served by letting thing be – even 
if this meant inequality, and even monopolies on the religious scene? 
Armenia provides us with a concrete context in which to consider these 
and other criticisms of the international religious freedom agenda. 
 On the one side, how could one not respect the heroic situation 
of the HAAC, just emerging from Stalinist oppression – a fact to which 
the Venice Commission report gave scant recognition (Paragraph 43). 
(And, what form would that take, short of complying with the will of 
the HAAC in all things religious in Armenia?) And, given the massive 
majority of those who identified with the HAAC in the country, wasn’t 
it a bit artificial, in effect, to consider it just one of another set of 
competing religions, all equal in the sight of God and the global market 
of religions? (But, how could religious liberty for the missionaries be 
assured short of that?) On the other side, the whole range of (mostly) 
Protestant evangelicals and the LDS, with their ample funding from 
abroad, their powerful mass media, their competitive insurgent’s 
energy, were not to be denied. (But, whose country were they seeing 
operate?) The Protestant missionaries also brought a modern sense 
openness coupled with a winning desire to do good for Armenia. How 
and why should this be resisted? 
 But, maybe, these dilemmas, naturally provoked by the market 
model, signaled the limit to that model’s utility?  What is more, this 
conclusion would be not only apply to Armenia, but to all the nations 
of the former USSR, including Greece and Turkey – wherever either, 
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officially or not, a national religion was in place. In some quarters, the 
idea of markets in religions may seem uncontroversial, even morally 
imperative. But, being “on the ground” in Armenia confronts one with the 
fact of the actual feasibility of the market model. Hegemony, monopoly, 
or whatever one wants to call them, are real. The Armenian market in 
religions seemed hopelessly fixed from every angle, certainly from the 
viewpoint of the HAAC and its local hegemony. But, also it was fixed, or 
at least unbalanced, from the perspective of the missionary religions, 
with the material advantages they brought to the market. 
 While it may be easier to understand the advantages accruing to 
missionary competitiveness, the ways the HAAC’s local position gave 
it market power are far less obvious. An unwelcome opportunity to 
discover the subtleties of market manipulation by the HAAC came with 
visit to the teachers’ college at Gyumri. I share it at this point to flesh 
out the idea of how markets can be manipulated, here, worse than 
that, how markets can be undermined even before they have had a 
chance to set up shop. The point is, of course, not to let a potential 
competitor set up shop at all. That is, in effect, what happened at the 
state teacher’s college in Gyumri.
Subverting the Marketplace of Ideas about Religious Liberty at the Gyumri
 Anyone who wishes to understand the myriad ways states 
repress religions, and thus restrict religious liberty should consult Ani 
Sarkissian’s, The Varieties of Religious Repression (Sarkissian 2016). 
She gives us the first relentlessly thorough account of the devices, 
policies, techniques, strategies and such used by modern nation-
states to manipulate religion within their borders. In fact, Sarkissian 
details so many, that it would be impossible to begin doing her 
itemization justice. Here, nevertheless are some examples. States 
may begin by preventing individuals from participating in religious 
services, or restricting certain groups from participating in religious 
services, then move on to restricting the location of, or architecture 
of, places of worship. Not enough, limiting the hours that religious 
gathering places may be open to the public helps repressive policies, 
as does coercing conversion, restricting proselytizing directly, or the 
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formation of religious communities through discriminatory registration 
or monitoring requirements. Then, there is always the control over 
clerical appointments, restricting religious speech, banning religious 
political parties, and so on and so on (Sarkissian 2016:27ff). 
 Less noticed by Sarkissian, however, are how attempts to defeat, 
repress, subvert, or undermine a free market of ideas aid the efforts 
to undermine a free market in religious liberty. In Gyumri, I discovered 
that it did so by blocking the application of the methods of modern 
religious studies – by preventing religion itself from becoming an object 
of academic or scientific study. At its most elementary, these efforts 
are aimed at stifling any talk about religion in the public square that 
purports to be neutral, or disinterested with respect to the doctrinal 
or other positions under discussion. In effect, this attack upon open 
discourse is part and parcel of the way repressive states seek to 
control civil society, in all its diversity. By “neutral,” I do not mean some 
absolute objectivity, disinterestedness, or neutrality, with respect to 
any and all values, but only a “relative” neutrality – one with respect to 
dogmatic positions in the contested religious field of inquiry. In a field 
represented by Catholics and Protestants, an investigator committed to 
Buddhist, Confucian, Hindu, Jewish or Muslim values might be deemed 
interested with respect to those values. However, they could claim 
such prima facie “relative neutrality” with respect to the Protestants 
and Catholics contestants. 
 But, in the case I want to illuminate, agents of market manipulation, 
here, friendly to the HAAC, sought to defeat, undermine, subvert, stifle, 
and so on, neutral inquiry. They sought to discredit the values of open 
and disinterested inquiry – here, involving the scientific study of, religion, 
itself. I have discovered that such a strategy of the repression of inquiry 
may involve at least three elements. I would be surprised if my list 
of three broad kinds of techniques of undermining open, disinterested 
discussion is exhaustive, so readers may want to contribute their own 
to those I have spelt out here. 
 The occasion in question was a talk held before a group of about 
40 youthful, future teachers at the Gyumri Teachers’ College. I prepared 
for the seminar, ready with a brief, 15-minute PowerPoint presentation – 
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really, no more than “fish food” to encourage discussion about religious 
liberty. I really did not offer my own thinking about how to solve the 
various conundrums connected to this subject – frankly, because I had 
no solution to these thorny problems! Instead, I would have been pleased 
just to listen to and learn about the concerns and opinions of what looked 
to be a keen group of about 40 young students. As people started taking 
their seats, I noticed a group of older men, curiously situating themselves, 
as if by assignment, about the room. When question time began, I soon 
learned why. Before a single student could speak, however, instead of 
some light-hearted give and take, those strategically seated older men 
began peppering me with questions, so much so that they, in effect, 
monopolized questioning. In Gyumri, they not only turned up in force, 
arrayed strategically around the room, but they echoed and reinforced 
each other. Who were they? I thought, perhaps, they were teachers, or 
mature students, returning for further credentialing. I never really learned 
who they were, but they succeeded in their purpose. I thought nothing 
of it at the time, but in retrospect, now I realize what had happened. 
In effect, I got caught in a carefully concocted ambush conducted that 
attempted to undermine discussion with provocations, attempts to 
bait or distract me as a primary discussant, by tempting me to pursue 
tangential issues. It was obvious that my tormenters were practiced in 
the art of undermining open discourse by a combination of monopolizing 
discussion or diverting it.
 Second, silencing discussion. The antics of these older men 
succeeded in effectively silencing other members of the assembly from 
effectively speaking. Students seemed to recognize them for what they 
were, and feared them. Their mere presence effectively intimidated the 
others in the assembly into silence. In Gyumri, the students took note. 
They knew who they were, even though I did not. They had seen this 
movie before, and kept their heads down.
 Third, entrapment. Finally, and subtlest of all, these agents of 
repression might try to trap a speaker into veering from neutrality. They 
might do this by challenging a speaker to declare their “where they 
stand,” typically by challenging the candor of a speaker for withholding 
their own commitments. But, were one to surrender and accept being 
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the bearer of a “message,” a speaker would lose their credentials as an 
honest broker, as neutral, in a given discussion. In Armenia, for instance, 
I truly wanted to orient myself to the local situation by scrupulously 
seeking to listen to all sides in the dispute over religious liberty. At one 
point, apparently exasperated by my passive stance, I was asked by one 
of the agents of repression, “But what is your message?” I was briefly 
stunned, since delivery a message was really far from my mind. If I had 
a hidden agenda, which I ironically did not have, it would have been that 
I had no agenda, no message! But, despite lacking a message, when 
asked such a question, I do admit having felt tempted to retort with a 
reply as requested. Yet, had I done so, rather than stammer, as I did, 
something about not having a message, I would have trapped myself 
into being seen as just another dogmatist, just another messenger. I 
would have been tricked into defeating my own purposes of seeking 
open, disinterested, neutral discussion. In Armenia, agents of repression 
were ready with an ample armory of weapons ready to defeat serious 
engagement in questions about religious liberty by first undercutting the 
possibility of discussing religion at all in neutral, or non-dogmatic, ways. I 
was truly thus caught in a verbal “ambush.” But, though I may have been 
left for dead, I was far from it.
If Not Markets, What?
 In Gyumri, then, I experienced, first-hand, how a marketplace of 
religious can be frustrated from forming at all. A symptom of Armenia’s 
religious polarization, it, nonetheless, did offer food for thought. One way 
I had thought to tease out some views was in fact, objectively and frankly, 
to present an alternative model to the religious liberty market model. 
For starters, one might try to recognize the concerns of the HAAC, and 
argue that we should query the idea of a truly free-for-all, open market, 
where religions duked it out against one another. This was nothing but an 
attempt to provoke a discussion of how we could we better conceive the 
relationship between the HAAC and both the new Protestant missionary 
churches? The same goes as well for the local, resident Protestant (also 
some Roman Catholic and Orthodox) churches of relative longstanding? 
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What model would enshrine the values that would best prescribe how 
these communities should look on each other? 
 First, just to shake up things a bit, a little thought adventure. When 
situations seem so dire, we tend to focus more and more on the details 
of our immediate slice of history, here, in Armenia in the 21st century. 
But, why not reset our perspective first and assume a grander purview? 
Imagine a vantage point 50,000 feet above Armenia and 50,00 years 
into the past. From there, Armenia, much like Israel/Palestine, sits 
squarely on a land bridge between larger continental masses. Human 
migrations out of Africa had traipsed across this “Armenia” for tens 
of thousands of years. Contrary to the way, Armenians may feel 
in Fortress Armenia, the space occupied by today’s Armenia has 
always swarmed with peoples on the move. Understandably, both 
the trauma of the genocide and its newly acquired independence 
has made Armenians more conscious of their vulnerability, finitude 
and isolation. But, especially when we add the stunning reality of 
the Armenian diaspora to my imaginative reflection on Armenia’s 
place in the prehistoric movement of peoples, the present fixation 
upon the present-day Republic of Armenia might begin to seem 
disproportionate. If the ancient history of Armenia challenges beliefs 
about Armenian uniqueness and insulation from the flows of history, 
what does it mean to Armenian self-consciousness that three times 
the number of Armenians live in the diaspora than in the Republic – 10 
million there, and only 3.5 million in Armenia, proper. 
 Let me suggest that these historic and demographic facts might 
offer reasons to reconsider the stalemate endgame that the market vs. 
monopoly model of religious relationship in Armenia has produced? 
I find it hard to believe that the only way to think about religions in 
relation is either as competing commodities in an ideal-type market or 
as alienated subjects of a religious monopoly. This is not to say that 
another model, such as I shall now suggest, will be flawless, or indeed 
that any model for thinking about this matter will be. But, what harm 
can come from entertaining different ways of conceiving situation – 
especially those that seem at loggerheads?
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The Values of Being Good Hosts and Guests
 Accordingly, to challenge the ubiquitous model of market vs. 
monopoly values, one might consider another possible alternative 
model of values regulating religious interaction – the values of being 
good hosts/guests. In particular, as I shall now elaborate, one might 
regard the non-HAAC churches seeking access to Armenia as potential 
“guests.” If such a substitution sounds softheaded or sentimental, or both, 
I would strongly object. Indeed, the guest/host model has particularly 
apt application to Armenia. Consider the particularity of Armenia’s well-
known and often celebrated diaspora communities. Armenians have 
been welcome “guests” the whole world over, however, familiar, even 
if painfully so, this may be. Were I an Armenian, I would be distinctly 
proud that Armenian “guests” (i.e., migrants) have a history of being so 
welcomed in so many different parts of the world. (I, of course, exclude 
the Genocide.) Today Armenians are, in effect, one of the world’s more 
prominent and successfully integrated “guest” communities. Indeed, 
the vitality, growth, deployment and success of the international 
Armenian migrant diaspora ought to be recognized as a great success 
story of international social integration.  But, the very success of the 
diaspora, the very warmth of the welcome accorded Armenians in 
diaspora, puts Armenia in debt to the world. Is not something owed in 
return? Thus, far from being soft and sentimental, proposing this guest/
host model recognizes the reciprocal debt Armenia has incurred to be 
a host nation itself. 
 In Armenia, complaints of suppression by Protestant missionary 
groups have, in effect, made religious liberty an issue in Armenia. They 
feel aggrieved by feeling frozen out of the Armenian marketplace of 
religions by the monopoly power of the HAAC. They claim that the 
HAAC or its agents have sought to restrict their ability to “sell” their 
version of religion in the Armenian marketplace. Put in the alternative 
mode that I am proposing, why would not we say as well that the HAAC 
does not wish to “host” the Protestant missionaries, it does not want 
to extend to them the honor of being “guests” in Armenia. (I need to 
say immediately, however, that several of the non-HAAC churches 
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are well-established in Armenia, and not “new” in the sense that the 
post-1989 mission churches are, and hence do not exactly qualify a 
“guests.” The Armenian Evangelical Church, for example, dates from 
1846 in Armenia. Small numbers of Roman Catholics and Russian 
Orthodox, but notably evangelicals (1%) balance to over 92% who 
claim allegiance to the AAC) Might, then, this alternative perspective 
of religious contact as conforming more to the host/guest model than 
the liberal market model, at least, make us stop and think, even if we 
rushed back to our old positions thereafter?
 I have no solution for this puzzle, but cannot help but perhaps 
elaborating it according to the guest/host model may induce some fresh 
thinking. I have already said why it might be argued that Armenians find 
themselves in an awkward position with respect to others, wishing to 
come to Armenia, since their own kind have been so welcomed abroad. 
How would one counter the argument that the very existence of such a 
large diaspora – about 4 times the population of Armenia proper – may 
place a moral burden upon Armenians to be good “hosts” of these new 
stranger religions? Next, of course, a lack of hospitality towards the 
new missionary groups could be said to offend longstanding cultural 
norms. A glance at Armenia’s location on the Caucasian land bridge 
between the Middle East and northeastern Europe and central Asia, 
and its 50,000 year history as a conduit for migrant human populations 
for bespeak a people who have learned how to engage the stranger. 
Despite its present-day look of isolation, Armenia has always been 
a crossroads of world’s populations. Does any of this suggest new 
policies towards the new “visitors”? 
 Up to this point, I have been showing how the values expressed in 
the guest/host model of relations suggest other modes of behavior that 
the HAAC “hosts” might have otherwise not considered. But thinking 
about the relation of say, the new missionaries and the HAAC, cuts 
both ways. Replacing the market model with the host/guest model has 
value implications the new Protestant missionaries. A “guest” is not the 
same as a “consumer” or “salesperson.” If the Protestant missionaries 
think of themselves more as guests than as salespeople do, I believe 
they would have to entertain different sorts of values in regulating their 
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behavior. A “guest” in Armenia, say, should conceive of themselves, 
first, as having been given the gift of, at least, provisional acceptance. 
Guests, unlike, salespeople or consumers, are not free of the logic of 
gift and obligation. The entire point of replacing gift with commodity 
is precisely to eliminate moral considerations.  Caveat emptor. As 
a guest, however, one would be expected to behave as if one were 
welcomed into the Armenian “house,” so to speak. As such, guests 
are expected to restrain themselves in certain ways, even as they 
enjoy corresponding privileges. The best silverware is put out for the 
guest, but correspondingly, the guest is trusted not to run off with the 
silverware, as it were! Or, guests are expected to educate themselves 
about their hosts, so that they can, again, behave accordingly. For 
instance, it would seem to be both seemly good manners and decent 
historical awareness that the new missionary religions in Armenia 
recognize what the HAAC is and has been. One might, also, frankly 
admit the oddity of Christians seeking to missionize the first officially 
Christian nation! Why would not that be a little like a case of “bringing 
coals to Newcastle”? Further, putting such encounters into a broader 
and deeper historical context, we might all be reminded of the ignorant 
disrespect Latin Christians have meted out to Eastern Christians over 
a very long history, whether in Protestant or Roman Catholic form.
 For these reasons alone, more systematic acknowledgment, 
respect and admiration on the part of Latin Christians for their poorer 
Eastern cousins might be in order. I am not sure what form that should 
take, or what will, should or could happen once it did. Perhaps host/
guest reciprocity could if those foreign, American, say, missionary 
groups took the lead in receiving Armenian immigrants into their new 
homes in the Diaspora? Are the foreign Christian missionaries being 
good ‘Christians’ at home by offering real hospitality to Armenian 
migrants to the United States?  Doing so might start a “virtuous cycle” 
of guest/host reciprocity, perhaps even educating would-be Protestant 
Christian missionary churches about the place of HAAC in the history 
of Christianity? But, until the sometimes-perceived zeal of the new 
foreign missionaries is tempered by some humility for the historic 
communities of Eastern Christianity, the new missionaries risk being 
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seen as barbarians who offend all the ancient and sacred rules of 
hospitality. Without the realization of a theology of mutual respect and 
recognition, both sides will continue to be estranged from each other. 
That is work for theologians on all sides of this issue.
 The challenge remains great for those who want to foster open 
discussions of central values about the optimal relation of religions in 
post-Soviet states, like Armenia, with its historic national churches. 
Perhaps, too much is invested in the outcomes of such discussions for 
principal participants? As a result, really open conversation about key 
values becomes difficult, whether by nature or by deliberate resistance. 
I can say this with some authority, because not only my Gyumri 
conference and talk systematically subverted, but also immediately 
thereafter the HAAC authorities canceled my much-anticipated meeting 
with their seminarians. Whether this was in anticipation of my merely 
trotting out the familiar position of the US religious liberty agenda or 
not, I shall never know. But, if the HAAC seminary authorities felt every 
visitor was going to “sing” from the RFRA (the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act), IRFA (International Religious Freedom Act) and the 
Venice Commission report’s “hymnals,” they could easily have justified 
the cancelation to themselves. “Who are these people to preach to, the 
HAAC, about religion in our own country?!”  What need Armenia for a 
new batch of Christian missionaries, when it was already a nation of 
Christians, indeed an officially Christian nation – the first – since 303 
CE? But, other visitors might have loved to have had a chance to listen 
and learn from them about their perspective on the entire religious 
liberty question.  
 Ironically, the authorities often do not realize that even visiting 
American academics could have deep sympathies for their doubts 
about the Western, neo-liberal, market model of religions proposed 
for Armenia by the EU and the US. For instance, the often-triumphal 
arrogance of today’s reformed Latin Christians rehearses the historic 
disrespect for Coptic and Orthodox Christianity that Saba Mahmood 
so well explored recently. (Danchin, et al. 2015) Such deep-seated or 
deeply designed suspicions, alas, can successfully prevent reaching 
some level of mutual recognition and respect. So, leaders of the 
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historic Eastern churches might want at least to listen to what the next 
roving academic has to say. Some of us academics value openness. 
We seek to learn from others by listening by virtue of the very vocation 
we have chosen to pursue. Some Western academics do respect the 
historic churches of the East, as much as they feel sympathy for the 
sometimes struggling, sometimes well-financed missionaries from the 
West. I have tried to argue here that both sides might better exploit the 
situation of contact and exchange by seeing each other as hosts and 
guests, rather than as buyer and sellers of religion. 
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